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Abstract Physical layer security is a promising ap-
proach that can benefit traditional encryption methods.
The idea of physical layer security is to take ad-
vantage of the features of the propagation medium and
its impairments to ensure secure communication in the
physical layer. This work introduces a comprehensive
review of the main information-theoretic metrics used
to measure the secrecy performance in physical layer
security. Furthermore, a theoretical framework related
to the most commonly used physical layer security tech-
niques to improve the secrecy performance is provided.
Finally, our work surveys physical layer security re-
search over several enabling 5G technologies, such as
massive multiple-input multiple-output, millimeter wave
communications, heterogeneous networks, non-orthogonal
multiple access, and full-duplex. Also, we include the
key concepts of each of the aforementioned technolo-
gies. Future fields of research and technical challenges
of physical layer security are also identified.
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1 Introduction
The increasing demands for wireless applications and
the rapid growth of the number of connected users have
saturated the capacity of current wireless communica-
tion systems. These fundamental problems motivate re-
searchers and network designers to provide novel solu-
tions that guarantee ultra-high data rates, ultra-wide
radio coverage, a massive number of efficiently con-
nected devices, ultra-low latency, and efficient energy
consumption. In this sense, the fifth generation of wire-
less networks (5G) foresees great advances on solutions
that satisfy these stringent requirements by employing
intelligent and efficient technologies [1]. Accordingly,
5G must be prepared to tackle major challenges con-
cerning the reliability, security, and efficiency of the net-
work. Specifically, the security paradigm protecting the
confidentiality of wireless communication is one of the
core problems to be considered in 5G [2].Unlike the tra-
ditional security systems that are based on higher layer
cryptographic mechanisms [3], physical layer security
(PLS) uses the inherent randomness (e.g., noise and
fading) of the wireless channel to ensure secure com-
munications in the physical layer [2]. In particular, PLS
offers a great advantage comparing cryptographic algo-
rithms, since it does not rely on computational com-
plexity. Therefore, the security level achieved will not be
affected even if the eavesdropper has unlimited comput-
ing capabilities. This contrasts with encryption-based
approaches, which is based on the idea that eavesdrop-
per has reduced computational capabilities to solve dif-
ficult mathematical problems in limited periods [4].
2The first ideas of PLS are from the seminal paper
of Shannon, who laid the basis of secrecy systems [5].
Later, the wiretap channel was presented by Wyner in
1975 [6]. In that work, Wyner established that secret
messages can be transmitted when the wiretap channel
is a degraded (much noisier) version of the legitimate
link. Thus, the secrecy capacity is the maximum data
rate that can be safely transmitted without being de-
coded by an eavesdropper. In practice, due to the in-
trinsic randomness of the medium, the signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) of the eavesdropper can be similar or even
better than the legitimate channel. Specifically, when
the eavesdropper is closer to the source than the legiti-
mate receiver. So, Wyner’s ideas become impracticable
in such environments. Inspired by Wyner’s work, in-
vestigations of the attainable secrecy capacity against
eavesdropping were addressed in [7] for the broadcast
channel, and the Gaussian channel in [8]. These ap-
proaches have inspired an important amount of recent
research activities from the information theoretic point
of view for different fading channels. Specifically, we
survey the fading channel models that have proven to
accurately characterize mm-Wave scenarios in 5G. We
can mention the following: 1) κ-µ shadowed: In this fad-
ing model, the received power signal is structured by a
finite sum of multipath clusters. Each cluster is mod-
eled by a dominant component and scattered diffuse
waves. All the specular components are subject to the
shadowing fluctuation caused by obstacles or human
body movements [9]. The PLS performance over κ-µ
shadowed was analyzed in [10]. 2) α-η-κ-µ: As pointed
out in [11], this is a rather complex fading model that
encompasses virtually all the fading channel models
proposed in the literature based on a power envelope
formulation. Such a model incorporates the relevant
short-term propagation factors, viz., non-linearity of
the medium, scattered waves, specular components, and
multipath clustering. The corresponding PLS perfor-
mance undergoes α-η-κ-µ fading channels was studied
in [12]. 3) Fluctuating Two-Ray: In this channel model,
the receiver signal can be expressed as a superposition
of two dominant waves, plus additional waves associ-
ated with diffuse scattering. Also, a fluctuation in the
amplitude of the dominant rays is assumed. This fact
is due to blockage by obstacles or by various electro-
magnetic disturbances. The secrecy performance over
Fluctuating Two-Ray and Multiple-Rays fading chan-
nels were investigated in [13], and [14], respectively. 4)
Fisher-Snedecor F : In this composite fading proposed
in [14], the received signal is modeled by jointly com-
bining the effects of shadowing and small-scale fading.
The PLS analysis over Fisher-Snedecor F fading chan-
nels was introduced in [15].
Other works that analyze PLS performance with dif-
ferent network topologies over generalized fading chan-
nels are: Transmit Antenna Selection/Maximal Ratio
Combining (TAS/MRC) [16], multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) [17], Full-Duplex [18], and Cognitive
Radio System [19, 20].
The goal of this work is to provide a comprehen-
sive survey of PLS on enabling technologies for 5G.
Firstly, the main PLS performance metrics are intro-
duced, including secrecy capacity, secrecy outage prob-
ability (SOP), alternative secrecy outage formulation,
fractional equivocation, average information leakage rate,
intercept probability, and the probability of strictly pos-
itive secrecy capacity (SPSC). A brief background on
these metrics is also provided. Next, a theoretical frame-
work on the PLS techniques commonly used to im-
prove the secrecy performance is revisited. Then, we
review the basic concepts of emerging 5G technologies.
In particular, we focus on the following: massive MIMO,
millimeter-wave (mm-Wave) communications, hetero-
geneous networks (HetNets), non-orthogonal multiple
access (NOMA), and full-duplex (FD). Subsequently,
we summarize the latest PLS research advances on the
aforementioned 5G technologies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 presents some fundamentals for PLS
and reviews the main secrecy performance metrics. The
PLS techniques are introduced in Section 3. Section 4
summarizes concepts of promising 5G technologies and
presents the recent advances in PLS research on these
key 5G technologies. Section 5 presents some of the
open challenges in wireless security communications,
and provides some concluding remarks.
2 Fundamentals of Physical Layer Security
Here, we introduce essential concepts to understand
PLS in wireless communications systems.
2.1 General System Model
The general PLS model is made up of three main com-
munication nodes as shown in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1 The wiretap channel model consisting of two legiti-
mate nodes and an eavesdropper.
The first node is the legitimate transmitter (also
known as Alice in network security jargon), the sec-
ond node is the intended receiver (also known as Bob),
and the third node is the eavesdropper (also known as
Eve). The channel between Alice and Bob is known as
the legitimate channel, while the path between Alice
and Eve is named the wiretap channel (also known as
Eavesdropper channel). In this setup, Alice transmits
confidential information to Bob, while Eve receives the
signal and intends to decode it. Therefore, Alice’s goal
is to use a transmission approach that can deliver the
secret information to Bob, while making sure that Eve
cannot intercept the transmitted information. To at-
tain secrecy in wireless systems, PLS uses signal pro-
cessing techniques designed to take advantage of spe-
cific features of the channel including fading, noise, in-
terference, among others. Another relevant factor to
take into account in the wiretap channel (see, Fig. 1)
is the availability of channel state information (CSI)
in all the nodes (i.e., Alice, Bob, and Eve). CSI can
vary from complete, partial to even null at the nodes.
From a secrecy perspective, CSI is of paramount im-
portance because based on its knowledge, the trans-
mitter can decide whether or not to transmit and at
which rate. Thus, this fact will lead to achieving a re-
markable improvement on the SOP. However, in prac-
tice, all nodes can only obtain some kind of information
about the channel between them and the other nodes.
On the one hand, Alice is generally considered to know
Bob’s CSI but not Eve’s CSI. This is because Eve is
typically passive (i.e., Eve monitors the network, inter-
cepts messages, and does not communicate with other
users in the network). Several works such as [21–23]
have a done performance analysis of PLS with passive
eavesdropper. On the other hand, there are scenarios
in which Eve is active and performs some of the fol-
lowing actions: intentional interference (also known as
jamming), adulteration and modification or denial of
service [24]. Performance analysis of PLS, which con-
sider Alice knows Eves channel (i.e., active eavesdrop-
per) can be found in [25–27]. It is worthwhile to mention
that in the PLS evaluation, Eves and Bobs channels are
typically assumed to be independent of each other (i.e.,
both channels are separated at least half wavelength).
Furthermore, the links (i.e., Alice-to-Bob and Alice-to-
Eve) that do not meet the aforementioned condition
(i.e., correlated channels) are investigated in [28–30].
2.2 Performance Metrics
In this section, we explain the most used secrecy metrics
proposed in the literature. Good knowledge of these
metrics will ease the understanding of the works to be
addressed in the following sections.
2.2.1 Secrecy Capacity
The secrecy capacity, CS, for a wireless channel is the
most used metric in PLS evaluation. CS is defined as
the capacity difference between the main and wiretap
channels. Rigorously speaking, it defines the maximum
secret rate at which the secret information reliably re-
covers at transmitter while remaining unrecoverable at
Eve [31]. Therefore, the CS in a quasi-static fading chan-
nel case is formulated as in [6] by
CS =max {CB − CE, 0}
=max {Wlog2(1 + γB)−Wlog2(1 + γE), 0} (1)
where |·| is the absolute value, γX =
|hAX|
2PA
N0
for X
∈ {B,E} is the SNR, and hAB and hAE are the chan-
nel coefficients of the main and wiretap channels, re-
spectively. PA is the transmit power at Alice, N0 is
the average noise power, and CB and CE are the ca-
pacities of the main and wiretap channels, respectively.
Without loss of generality, it is considered a normalized
bandwidth W = 1 in the aforementioned capacity for-
mulations. Under this scenario, it is possible to attain
secure transmissions only if the legitimate link has a
better SNR than the eavesdropper link, i.e.,
CS =
{
log2
(
1+γB
1+γE
)
, if γB > γE
0, if γB ≤ γE,
(2)
It is worthwhile to highlight that the CS is widely ex-
tended by researchers to compute the SOP [32].
2.2.2 Secrecy Outage Probability
The SOP is defined as the probability that the secrecy
capacity falls below a target secrecy rate of RS. In other
words, when the current CS is not more than a pre-
established target RS, the secrecy outage happens. This
4fact means that the current secrecy rate cannot guar-
antee the security requirement. It can be formulated as
in [33] by
SOP = Pr {CS (γB, γE) < RS}
(a)
= Pr
{(
1 + γB
1 + γE
)
< 2RS
}
(b)
≥ Pr
{
γB
γE
< 2RS
}
(3)
where Pr {·} denotes probability. The SOP in (a) in-
dicates that whenever RS < CS, the wiretap channel
will be worse than the legitimate channel. So, secure
communications are possible [34]. It is worth mention-
ing that the state of the art on the research topic of
PLS over different types of fading channels focuses on
the calculation of (b) due to its simpler mathemati-
cal tractability concerning the formulation in (a). Fur-
thermore, the formulation in (b) is well-known as the
lower bound of the SOP and represents the ratio of two
squared random variables (RVs), namely: γB and γE,
which can follow any fading distribution. In this con-
text, to assess the PLS performance over generalized
channels and their corresponding special cases, two re-
cent works proposed in [35, 36] developed closed-form
fashions for the ratio of two squared RVs of the vast
majority of fading channels models used to character-
ize the propagation environment of the 5G. Despite the
important insights that the SOP provides in the char-
acterization of secrecy performance, it has the following
demerits: i) it cannot quantify the amount of data leak-
ing to the eavesdroppers when the outage happens (i.e.,
transmission security); ii) it cannot offer any informa-
tion about the bob’s skill to decode transmitted data
successfully (i.e., transmission reliability); iii) it cannot
offer any information about the eavesdropper’s skill to
decrypt confidential data successfully; iv) it cannot be
straightly connected with quality of service (QoS) re-
quirements for network services [37]. Motivated by the
limitations of the SOP, researchers in [38, 39] proposed
new metrics to overcome the three aforementioned de-
merits of the SOP. Thus, the authors give more insights
into PLS and how secrecy is measured. It is worthwhile
to mention that the definition of the SOP and the CS
can also be used to the scenario with multiple anten-
nas at different nodes. Readers are referred to [40–42]
for further analysis of this field. Next, according to the
classical SOP defined above, alternative secrecy outage
formulations from (3) are defined to follow.
2.2.3 Alternative Secrecy Outage Formulation
As previously mentioned the conventional SOP formu-
lation in (3) does not distinguish between reliability and
security. Therefore, an outage event in (3) can imply ei-
ther a fault to achieve secrecy or that the transmitted
message cannot be successfully decoded by Bob. In light
of the above considerations, an alternative secrecy out-
age formulation was proposed in [43], which measures
that a transmitted data fails to attain secrecy. In a such
formulation, the rate difference RE
∆
= RB −RS denotes
the cost of security when the data is transmitted. Also,
RB, is the rate of the transmitted messages, and RS
is the rate of the confidential data. It is worth men-
tioning that Bob can decode any transmitted message
successfully if and only if CB > RB, whilst secrecy fails
if CE > RE. Therefore, the alternative SOP can be for-
mulated as the conditional probability upon a message
being transmitted.
SOPA = Pr {CE > RB −RS|message transmission}
(4)
Unlike the SOP definition in (3), the formulation in (4)
takes into consideration important system design pa-
rameters including the rate of the transmitted messages
RB, and the fact whether a message was transmitted
or not. Furthermore, this metric is useful when Alice
knows the instantaneous Bob’s CSI. Since in this sce-
nario, Alice chooses whether or not to transmit, and if
Alice decides to transmit, it will possibly do so with
varying rates depending on Bob’s CSI. In the contrast
case, i.e., when the transmission is carried out at a con-
stant rate1, the alternative SOP formulation in (4) re-
duces to the unconditional probability.
This metric is achieving success in the latest re-
search works related to performance in PLS. Readers
can revise [44–48] for more detailed information about
this research topic.
2.2.4 Fractional Equivocation Based Metrics
Based on the limitation of the classic SOP in (3) in mea-
suring both the amount of data leakage to the eaves-
dropper and Eve’s skill to decode confidential data,
three novel metrics was proposed in [49]. These metrics
measure the secrecy performance of wireless systems
from the partial secrecy perspective over quasi-static
fading. The fractional equivocation (i.e.,∆) is a random
quantity due to the fading characteristics of the prop-
agation medium. Mathematically, the fractional equiv-
ocation for a given fading realization of the channel is
expressed as [49]
1 This scenario corresponds to the case when bob knows
when Alice doesn’t know about the instantaneous Bob’s CSI
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∆ =


1, if CE ≤ CB −RS
(CB − CE) /RS, if CB −RS < CE < CB
0, if CB ≤ CE.
(5)
From (5), the authors in [49] proposed the following
metrics:
1. Generalized Secrecy Outage Probability
(GSOP): This metric is related to wireless systems
with distinct secrecy levels measured in terms of
Eve’s capability to decode the confidential informa-
tion and is given by
GSOP = Pr {∆ < θ} , (6)
where 0 < θ < 1 represents the minimum reason-
able value of the fractional equivocation. Here, Eve’s
skill to decrypt the confidential message is set by
selecting different values of θ. For instance, the con-
ventional SOP is a particular case of the GSOP for
θ = 1.
2. Asymptotic Lower Bound on Eve’s Decoding
Error Probability: This metric is defined as the
average of the fractional equivocation and is given
by
∆¯ =E [∆] , (7)
in which E [·] is the expectation operation. It is worth-
while to mention that, when the entropy of data for
transmission is long enough, Eve’s decoding error
probability for a given fading realization is lower
bounded by the fractional equivocation, i.e., Pe ≥
∆¯2.
3. Average Information Leakage Rate: This met-
ric offers an idea of how fast the data is leaked to
the Eve, when an unchanged rate transmission, RS,
is adopted in the system. It can be expressed as
RL = E [(1−∆)RS] =
(
1− ∆¯
)
RS. (8)
In [50,51], researchers investigated the PLS performance
by using different transmission topologies based on the
aforementioned metrics.
2.2.5 Intercept Probability
An intercept event happens when the CS is negative or
falls below 0. This means that the wiretap channel has a
better SNR than the legitimate channel. The intercept
probability can be formulated as in [52] by
Pint = Pr {CS (γB, γE) < 0} (9)
2 Interested readers can revise [49, Eq. (6)] for guidance
about why the average fractional equivocation gives a lower
bound of Eve’s decoding error probability.
Although this metric has not been widely explored in
the literature, it is currently being investigated in eval-
uating the secrecy performance of wireless channels.
Readers are referred to [53–55] for more information
on this field of research.
2.2.6 Probability of Strictly Positive Secrecy Capacity
The Probability of SPSC is the probability that the
CS remains higher than 0. This means that secrecy in
communication has been attained3. Mathematically, it
can be written as in [56] by
PSPSC = Pr {CS (γB, γE) > 0} . (10)
In [57–59], researchers investigated the security perfor-
mance of wireless systems based on the SPSC metric
over different fading channels models.
3 Physical Layer Security Techniques
This section introduces the background of PLS tech-
niques commonly used in the research community.
3.1 Artificial Noise Generation
The main idea of this technique is to artificially degrade
Eve’s channel by injecting artificial noise (AN). The
process consists in that an authorized node in the net-
work (e.g., Alice, Bob, or another) adds well designed
artificially jamming signals to the transmitted signal
that can only harm Eve’s channel [60]. The basic sys-
tem model of AN network for PLS is depicted in Fig. 2.
PSfrag replacements
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Fig. 2 The model of AN network for a wiretap channel con-
sisting of two main nodes and an eavesdropper.
In what follows, we review the fundamental works
that use AN or jamming to improve PLS performance.
In [61], the authors proposed the design of AN-aided
3 The authors in [37] provide the theoretical meaning as
well as the analytical expressions to quantify the CS (e.g.,
perfect secrecy, weak secrecy, and strong secrecy) when the
CS is greater than zero.
6precoding to enhance PLS in a multi-user single eaves-
dropper wiretap visible light communication (VLC) net-
works. A fairness comparison of three AN-aided secure
transmission approaches in wiretap channels was stud-
ied in [62]. In such work, it is was demonstrated that
regarding the secrecy performance the partially adap-
tive scheme (only the rate RB changes) outperforms
the on-off scheme (both RB and confidential rate RS
vary). In [63], the researches proposed a CS optimiza-
tion (SCO)-AN to improve the CS in wireless networks.
The results in such an approach demonstrated that
SCO-AN achieved greater improvement in the CS than
traditional AN.
3.2 Multi-Antenna Diversity
By leveraging the available spatial dimensions of wire-
less channels, MIMO techniques can diminish the im-
pacts of fading while increasing the CS [64]. To achieve
the full benefits of MIMO, the systemmust be protected
against eavesdroppers attacks.
PSfrag replacements Alice
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Fig. 3 A MIMO wireless system by using secure beamform-
ing with nulls directed towards Eve.
In Multi-Antenna Diversity, the basic idea of beam-
forming is to send the desired signal in the null space of
the eavesdropper channel as shown in Fig. 3. A sem-
inal work in [65] was the first to investigate beam-
forming schemes for enhancing the PLS performance in
MIMO wiretap channels. This paper encourages other
researches to investigate beamforming challenges regard-
ing PLS. Thus, in [66] the authors were the first to study
PLS in a two-tier downlink HetNets. A novel layered
PLS model was proposed in [67]. Here, the zero-forcing
beamforming was applied to layered PLS to tradeoff the
achievable secrecy performance and the computational
complexity. Moreover, an optimal technique commonly
used on the receiver side in MIMO systems for improv-
ing PLS was presented in [68].
3.3 Cooperative Diversity
In this section, we introduce cooperative communica-
tions, which besides providing reliability and extended
coverage are used for improving the PLS performance.
Relaying techniques allow the transmitter sends its in-
formation to the destination through a relay located be-
tween the two nodes. The most famous re-transmission
protocols are: i) amplify and forward (AF), and ii) de-
code and forward (DF) [37]. Relays can be configured in
different ways to counteract eavesdropping. Specifically,
they can behave like a conventional relay to attend the
legitimate communication (vide Fig. 4a), or they can
also act as jammers by sending AN to degrade Eve’s
channel. Moreover, they can take the role of potential
eavesdroppers when they are untrusted. So, the confi-
dential signals are vulnerable (vide Fig. 4b) [64].
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Fig. 4 a) Traditional relay network in wiretap channel. b)
Untrusted relay network in wiretap channel.
Next, we present interesting works on cooperative
relaying methods to provide PLS in wireless systems.
In [69], the authors were the first to use cooperative
relays for providing secure transmissions. In such work,
three cooperative schemes were considered: DF, AF,
and cooperative jamming (CJ)4 to maximize the at-
tainable secrecy rate subject to a transmit power con-
straint. The work in [70] studied the reachable secrecy
diversity gain of cooperative networks with untrusted
relays. In that approach, it was shown that the se-
crecy rate decreases as the number of untrusted relays
increases. To enhance the PLS of the untrusted relay
networks a new FD destination jamming (FDJ) topol-
ogy was introduced in [71]. The results showed that
4 In CJ, while the transmitter sends the data, the relay
transmits an interference signal to harm the eavesdropper’s
channel.
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FDJ strategies provided superior secrecy performance
to that of the non-jamming schemes.
4 Next Generation Physical Layer Technologies
Next-generation cellular networks are planned to attain
high capacity rates to face the rapid growth of data
traffic. The combination of 5G key technologies is con-
sidered as a cost-effective solution to cover the high QoS
requirements in 5G. However, the dramatical increase
in the amount of data and complex communication sce-
narios put forward higher requirements on the security
of 5G. Here, we review the notions of each of the promis-
ing enabling technologies for 5G, including their advan-
tages and disadvantages. Next, we summarize the latest
research results of PLS for 5G technologies.
4.1 Massive MIMO
Massive MIMO is a multi-user topology in which the
base station (BS) has a large number of antennas as
depicted in Fig. 5. These arrangements provide several
degrees of freedom for networks, better performance in
channel capacities, and improve communication quali-
ties in 5G networks [72]. For security purposes, massive
MIMO gives a very oriented beam guides to the loca-
tion of the legitimate user. So, the information leak-
age is reduced to undesired locations (i.e., Eve) signifi-
cantly [73].
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Fig. 5 Massive MIMO downlink with K legitimate user
nodes, Uk for k = 1, · · · ,K, and an eavesdropper.
The authors in [74] were the first to investigate the
drawbacks of PLS performance by assuming that the
number of antennas goes to infinity (i.e., massive MIMO).
Unlike the traditional MIMO, massive MIMO presents
the following big challenges: 1) CSI estimation process
is a difficult task; 2) the channels models are not inde-
pendent as the distances of antennas are shorter than
a half of the wavelength. Therefore, massive MIMO is
still an open research field [75]. Then, we survey the
current security attacks of massive MIMO relying on
passive and active eavesdropper cases, respectively.
4.1.1 Passive Eavesdropper Scenarios
The key concept here is that the existence of a passive
eavesdropper does not affect at all the beam of trans-
mission at the BS. So, it has a negligible effect on the
CS. Recently, in [76] an algorithm was developed to op-
timize power allocation of beam transmission for single-
cell massive MIMO consisting of a passive eavesdropper
with multiple antennas. The findings showed that beam
transmission can attain optimal performance in terms
of CS. Authors in [77] investigated secure transmissions
of multi-pair massive MIMO AF relaying systems by
considering Ricean fading. In that work, the attainable
sum secrecy rate is maximized by using a power con-
trol topology. Also, the use of AN-aiding schemes to
degrade the eavesdropping channel to improve the se-
curity in massive MIMO was analyzed in [78].
Other massive MIMO approaches with passive eaves-
droppers include the effect of hardware deficiencies on
the PLS performance of massive downlink MIMO in the
existence of eavesdropper with multiple antennas [79],
performance analysis of wireless communications in a
multi-user massive MIMO by using imperfect CSI [80],
and SOP analysis for massive MIMO scenarios [81].
4.1.2 Active Eavesdropper Scenarios
A large number of PLS research works consider that
Bob’s CSI is known at Alice and does not take into
account the process for obtaining this CSI. In time du-
plex division (TDD) massive MIMO, during the uplink
phase, legitimate nodes transmit pilot signals to the
BS to estimate the CSI for the later transmission of
the downlink. At the same time, an active eavesdrop-
per can interfere in the training stage to produce pi-
lot contamination at the BS (see Fig. 6). This forces
in the transmission phase (i.e., downlink) of the BS to
inherently beamform towards the eavesdropper increas-
ing its received signal power [82]. This fact compromises
that a secrecy rate may not be attainable. The result
of this attack is that the advantages of PLS for massive
MIMO are lost [83]. To circumvent the referred lim-
itation, the following works investigated techniques to
avoid the pilot contamination attack (PCA). In [84], the
authors proposed a reliable communication that does
not need statistical information about the links for a
TDD massive MIMO with an active eavesdropper. In
the proposed transmission, an asynchronous protocol is
used instead of the conventional synchronous protocol.
8A transmit power control policy was presented in [85],
to allocate transmit power at the BS/relay for maxi-
mizing the attainable secrecy rate in Massive MIMO
Downlink. For PLS in massive MIMO, in [86] was de-
signed robust scheme together with AN beamforming
to deliver the legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers dif-
ferent signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR).
Other secure massive transmissions against active
eavesdropper include cooperative scheme strategy [87],
data-aided secure downlink transmission scheme [88],
and the secure communications design based on game
theory [89].
Main channel
Wiretap channel
Uplink Without PCA Uplink With PCA
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Fig. 6 PCA on massive MIMO systems.
4.2 mm-Wave
Nowadays, most wireless systems are allocated in the
band spectrum of 300 MHz to 3 GHz, which is ex-
tremely full. In this context, mm-Wave5 is a very in-
novative key solution for the next wireless networks
(5G and beyond) to overcome this limitation. The idea
behind mm-Wave communications is to take advan-
tage of the unexploited high-frequency mm-wave spec-
trum, ranging from 3-300 GHz to face with future multi-
gigabit-per-secondmobile applications. Unlike microwave
networks, mm-Wave networks have several novel fea-
tures, such as a large number of antennas6, short-range,
and different propagation laws [92]. The adoption of
PLS mm-Wave networks systems is a remarkably emerg-
ing topic of research. Several approaches have been de-
veloped in this domain7. The general model of PLS for
mm-Wave, massive MIMO, FD, and Small Cells for 5G
5 To have a more detailed framework about millimeter wire-
less systems, we refer the reader to [90].
6 The small wavelength of high-frequency signals in mm-
Wave enables a big number of antennas, which can be ex-
ploited to cover the requirements of massive MIMO. There-
fore, the combination of massive MIMO, small cell geometries
(which will be described later), and mm-Wave has vast po-
tential to improve the security of the next networks [91].
7 For a good summary of works about the beginnings of
PLS in mm-Wave, we refer the reader to the survey in [93]
is presented in Fig. 7. Then, we review some of the cur-
rent works to highlight the potential of this emerging
field. The major research papers focus on 28, 38, and
60 GHz band [94].
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Fig. 7 Illustration of promising technologies such as mm-
Wave, massive MIMO, Full Duplex, and Small Cells.
In [95], to maximize the SNR (i.e., to improve the
CS), the authors proposed AN aided two stages secure
hybrid beamforming method in MIMO mm-Wave re-
lay eavesdropping scenario. Here, the combination of
the two-stage hybrid beamforming algorithm with AN
allows guaranteeing both high throughput and com-
munication security. The authors in [96] investigated
secure communications techniques, namely, maximum
ratio transmitting (MRT) beamforming, and AN beam-
forming. Specifically, it was developed the optimal power
allocation between AN and the signal of interest that
maximizes the CS for AN beamforming. Concerning ve-
hicular environments, in [97], the researchers proposed
a location-based PLS technique for secure mm-Wave
vehicular communication. Such a proposed technique
takes advantage of a large number of antennas at the
mm-Wave frequencies to jam eavesdroppers with sensi-
tive receivers. The technique proved to offer good per-
formance in terms of SOP.
Other approaches include PLS Analysis of Hybrid
mm-Wave Networks [98], and CS of 5G mm-Wave Small
Cells [99].
4.3 HetNets – Small Cells
Traditionally, macro-cellular networks are efficient in
offering area coverage for voice applications and services
that support low data traffic but limited in providing
high data rates. So, one of the promising solutions for
users is to reduce the cell size in future wireless net-
works [100]. In this context, HetNets will perform a
pivotal role to meet the demands of 5G. The goal of
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HetNetsis to make efficient use of the spectrum to sat-
isfy the spectacular growth of the data demands of the
upcoming mobile services. In the HetNets topologies,
users with different capabilities (i.e., transmission pow-
ers, coverage areas, etc.) are implemented to be part of
a multi-tier hierarchical structure, as depicted in Fig. 8.
The high-power nodes (HPNs) with broad radio cover-
age fields are located in the macro cell, while low-power
nodes (LPNs) with limited coverage are located in small
cells [4]. The small cells (typically with coverage of a few
meters) can have different configurations. For instance,
the femtocells that are usually used in homes and de-
velopment companies, and the picocells that are used
for ample outdoor coverage [100]. In addition, HetNets
include a device level that incorporates device-to-device
(D2D) communications. This technology favors nearby
devices to connect directly and collaborate without us-
ing HPNs/LPNs, making them a strong tool for low-
latency, and high-performance data services [101].
Device to Device
Macro BS
Femto
Femto
Femto
Pico
Pico
Pico
PSfrag replacements
U1
U2
U3
U4
U5
U6
U7
U8
U9
U10
Uk−1
UK
mm-Wave Backhaul
LOS communication
B
eam
form
ing
Eve
Eve
Eve
plink Without Pilot Contamination Attack
Uplink With Pilot Contamination Attack
NT-antennas
Main channel
Wiretap channel
Fig. 8 HetNets with legitimate users and eavesdroppers.
The multi-tier topology in HetNets entails techni-
cal challenges (e.g., self-organization, backhauling, han-
dover, and interference) to the investigation of PLS
compared to the traditional single-tier architecture [102].
Then, we review the most current works that address
the aforementioned challenges of the HetNets on PLS.
In two novel approaches [103,104], PLS performance in
multi-cell networks has been studied. The researchers
have taken advantage of cooperative multi-antenna trans-
missions to improve the CS by assuming: i) a single
eavesdropper [103], and ii) a multiple untrusted re-
lays [104]. In [105], the authors presented an interference-
canceled opportunistic antenna selection (IC-OAS) topol-
ogy to improve PLS in HetNets. Here, a passive eaves-
dropper is considered to intercept the communications
of both the macro and small cells.
Other secure communications works in HetNets sys-
tems include: Stochastic Geometry strategies [106], se-
crecy outage analysis undergo Nakagami-m fading chan-
nels [107], and secure communications design based on
game theory [108].
4.4 Full-Duplex
Among the promising technologies for 5G, FD technol-
ogy carries major challenges for PLS communications.
On one hand, FD enables the destination node to create
AN to interfere with the eavesdropper and receive the
data at the same time. On the other hand, if the eaves-
dropper has the FD technology, it can actively attack
the receiver in the transmission while eavesdropping.
Also, FD systems can double the spectral efficiency con-
cerning the common half-duplex schemes. However, the
main drawback that affects the transmission of FD is
the management of the self-interference signal imposed
by the transmission antenna on the receiving antenna
within the same transceiver [109]. The research on FD
PLS communication can be classified into four cate-
gorizations of FD PLS schemes. Specifically, the FD
receiver, the FD transmitter and receiver, the FD BS,
and the FD eavesdropper [93]. Next, we review the most
current works concerning the different configurations of
the aforementioned FD technology. In [110], the authors
proposed a novel channel training (CT) method for a
FD receiver to improve PLS. In this setup, the receiver
(i.e., Bob) is equipped with NB antennas. So, it can si-
multaneously receive the data and transmits AN to the
eavesdropper. Here, to diminish the non-cancelable self-
interference due to the transmitted AN, the destina-
tion node has to estimate the self-interference channel
before the communication stage. In [111] was consid-
ered a problem of a passive and clever eavesdropping
attack on the MIMO wiretap scheme, where the re-
ceiver operates with FD mode. In such a system model,
the clever eavesdropper cancels the interference (caused
by the receiver) by stealing the CSI between legitimate
nodes. To counteract this, the authors presented a coop-
erative jamming approach between transceivers to at-
tain the optimal PLS performance. About FD active
eavesdropper (FDAE), in [112], was analyzed the anti-
eavesdropping and anti-jamming performance of D2D
scenarios. In this case, the FDAE can passively inter-
cept secret data in D2D topologies and actively jam all
legitimate channels. In this respect, the authors pro-
posed a hierarchical and power control method with
multiple D2D node equipment and one cellular node to
confront the smart FDAE.
Other works include FD strategies in HetNets [113,
114], secrecy rate maximization in Wireless Multi-Hop
FD Networks [115], and secure communication based
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on joint design of information and AN beamforming
for FD Networks [116].
4.5 Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access
Due to the limited spectral efficiency of orthogonal mul-
tiple access (OMA) systems in wireless networks, the
OMA schemes are not appropriate to face the explosive
growth in data traffic of the 5G. As a result, NOMA
emerges as a promising candidate for 5G multiple ac-
cess to provide massive connectivity and large system
throughput [117]. Furthermore, it is well-known that
NOMA will use advanced reception techniques such
as successive interference cancellation (SIC) for robust
multiple access. This fact may be a drawback in terms of
processing delays. Fortunately, transmission/reception
schemes in low-latency for NOMA systems are being
investigated in the literature. The basic NOMA model
for PLS is shown in Fig. 9. There are two kinds of
eavesdroppers scenarios: i) the passive eavesdropper,
whose channel cannot be known at Alice; ii) the active
eavesdropper (i.e., common user), whose channel can
be known at Alice. Therefore, providing levels of secu-
rity against the two types of eavesdroppers in NOMA
technology is a challenging research topic in the design
of the 5G networks [37]. The main idea behind PLS for
NOMA is to mitigate the security problems by find-
ing the optimal power allocation policy that maximizes
the secrecy sum rate (SSR) while satisfying the QoS
requirements of users.
Then, we survey the key contributions regarding
PLS in 5G NOMA systems. In [118], the authors inves-
tigated the PLS performance in a single-input single-
output (SISO) NOMA scheme by maximizing the SSR
of the NOMA subject to the users QoS requirements.
Here, NOMA has proven a remarkable SSR improve-
ment concerning the classical OMA.
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In [119], the researchers proposed a secure transmis-
sion for downlink multiple-input single-output (MISO)
NOMA and energy-efficient design. In this approach,
it was shown that the cooperative jamming NOMA
scheme achieves much better secrecy performance than
the direct transmission NOMA scheme. The secrecy in
simultaneous wireless information and power transfer-
ring (SWIPT) in downlink NOMA systems was investi-
gated in [120]. Later, the security challenges of vehicular
users in an ultra-dense network were studied in [121].
Here, it was demonstrated that NOMA-based multiple
access is successful in attaining a high SSR for vehicular
users by efficiently designing the allocation resources.
Other interesting works include PLS performance of
uplink NOMA by using a stochastic geometry approach
to analyze the effective secrecy throughput [122], the
impact of random mobility on SSR maximization of
NOMA systems subject to power limits and users’ QoS
requirements [123], the achievable secrecy rate by us-
ing the optimal security beamforming design in NOMA
VLC networks [124], and the SSR optimization for both
primary users and randomly deployed secondary users
in the NOMA underlay cognitive radio network [125].
5 Conclusions and Future Research Directions
This work has tackled the fundamentals concepts and
techniques regarding PLS over the enabling 5G tech-
nologies. The following research topics emerge from the
reviewed technologies in this survey:
– Accurate fading channel models play a remarkable
role in an optimal secure transmission design over
5G. Thus, some efforts have been oriented to pro-
pose new more accurate channel models that pro-
vide a better fit to field measurements in a variety
of new mm-Wave propagation scenarios. In this con-
text, as claimed by the authors in [126] both Fluc-
tuating Multiple-Ray and the N -Wave with Diffuse
Power fading models constitute promising alterna-
tive models to characterize the propagation envi-
ronment on mm-Wave communications. Therefore,
the performance of PLS techniques over these gen-
eralized channels is an important topic for further
investigations.
– Providing PLS usually entails compromising other
system QoS requirements. For instance, high-security
levels usually sacrifice throughput, while AN schemes
compromise power efficiency. Based on these factors,
the characterizing of the secrecy metrics in novel
adversary models wireless through nontraditional
(e.g., fractional equivocation, average information
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leakage rate, and GSOP) metrics are essential tracks
in future research.
– In the security paradigms, a promising direction of
research is the integration of PLS and the classic
wireless cryptography. Specifically, the physical layer
features of the wireless medium can be exploited
for designing new security algorithms to improve
the current authentication and key management in
higher layers. However, the integration of both ap-
proaches has not been properly studied at present.
Thus, this topic needs further investigation.
– An interesting future research direction could be to
provide a detailed survey on the main drawbacks
and merits of physical layer authentication (PLA)
and Secret-Key Generation in 5G. In this sense, a
research field, which is not yet investigated exten-
sively in the literature, is the machine learning for
intelligent PLA in 5G wireless networks.
– Due to the combination of innovative technologies
to cover the growing demands of data traffic and
emerging services, it is essential to investigate PLS
techniques regarding these new network scenarios.
Within these networks, the following stand out: Un-
manned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), enhanced Mobile
Broadband (eMBB), Ultra-Reliable, and Low-Latency
Communications (URLLC), massive Machine-Type
Communications (mMTC), and Vehicle-to-Everything
(V2X) networks.
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